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according to lynne Baker we need to investigate the performances to understand if 
someone has a first-person perspective. My claim is that language has not the main role 
in the formation of epistemic states and self-consciousness. in children’s performances, 
we have evidence for a self-consciousness without “i” thoughts. We investigate if it is 
possible to understand the difference between a case of false belief and one of pretense. 
My aim is to demonstrate that pretense is not a proto-concept but a first-person fact, 
endowed with a rich phenomenology.
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According to Lynne Baker: “To have a robust first-person perspective, one 
must be able to manifest it” (baker 2013, p. 154). Well, how can children 
manifest their first-person perspective? If we consider this ability as 
our desideratum, i think it is instructive to compare it to its closest early 
manifestation, i.e., pretend play. it seems that intentionality is a necessary 
condition for the activity of pretense. In the first part of the paper I 
investigate if it is possible to understand the difference between a case 
of false belief and one of pretense. against the notion of prelief, an early 
status of indistinction between pretence and belief, our claim is that 
awareness is not dissociable from the first person perspective. However, a 
phenomenological approach must be supported by an epistemology that can 
explain how the mind is sensitive to the refractory nature of the world. the 
theory of agency allows us to highlight some relevant differences between 
first and third-person perspective. Then, we try to understand the limits of 
a theory that attributes to the language the main role in the formation of 
epistemic states and self-consciousness. Pretense, as an early manifestation 
of a set of pre-reflective self- and social cognition abilities, represents 
evidence for a self-consciousness without “i” thoughts.
angeline lillard (2001) has observed that every pretense act involves 
certain features, several of which are defining and necessary: there must 
be an animate pretender and a reality that is pretended about, a mental 
representation of an alternative situation must be involved and projected 
onto the reality, and, this is the austin’s requirement, action must be 
intentional. Without intention there is no pretense, as searle has noted too: 
“one cannot truly be said to have pretended to do something unless one 
intended to pretend to do it” (searle 1975, p. 325). Finally, “full awareness” 
of the actual situation and the represented one is required. i think that 
baker’s suggestion to investigate the performances brings us on the right 
track. however, at the outset, we need to better understand the ways one 
can talk about the “manifestation” of an ability. so, some insist on stressing 
the difference between imagination and explicit behavior emphasizing a 
more evident transparency and the intentional nature of mental states 
compared to simple behavior. as a consequence, transparency of the 
imaginative states is regarded as a logical prerequisite to understand the 
limits of the principle of “semantic innocence”, whereby the semantic value 
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of a referential expression ought to remain constant inside and outside the 
scope of a verb of attitude like “believe”. imagination would be the gateway 
to intensional contexts, namely those contexts in which two expressions 
with the same extension cannot be substituted salva veritate. i think that, 
to avoid confusing the transparency of the imagination with the opacity 
of the mind-world epistemic relation, it would be better to consider the 
transparency of imagination from the perspective of an epistemology of 
understanding, letting epistemic states, such as belief and desire, to pertain 
to an epistemology of knowledge1. mind, here, should learn to keep track of 
the world. in imagination the world offers us props, but what you must keep 
track of is different from the truth. now, we know, pretense and imagination 
are not overlapping phenomena. normally pretense acts are visible and 
children align their pretense responses with action. yet, pretense is well 
adapted because it is an activity able to combine features of acting with the 
epistemic ones of the intentional attitude2. 
Pretense is not a fact about what happens to the body in acting, but, on 
the other side, it is neither, as for Baker, a rudimentary, by default, first-
personal perspective. It is, rather, a first-person fact, endowed with a rich 
phenomenology. nevertheless, some have considered it a mere proto-
concept, not a full-developed mental concept. theorists will naturally 
balk at referring to children’s “belief” at all, so for example, according 
to Joseph Perner (1994), at the age of three children possess a concept, 
“prelief” (or “betence”), in which the concepts of pretense and belief coexist 
undifferentiated. the concept of prelief allows the child to understand 
that a person can “act as if” something was such and such (for example, 
as if “this banana is a telephone”) when it is not. at the age of four, they 
understand that, like the public representations, inner representations can 
also misrepresent states of affairs. this hypothesis lends itself to several 
criticisms. the idea of an early lack of distinction between pretense and 
false belief contains a confusion between ascriptions in the first and third-
person. For example, a first element that demonstrates the implausibility of 
the argument of indistinction is the recognition that engaging in pretense 
involves a certain degree of awareness that one is dealing with a not-real 
1   Following a rationalist tradition in meta-knowledge, we could formulate an approximate 
difference between transparency of imagination and opacity of full epistemic states in terms of 
weak and strong transparency:
- an epistemic state e is weakly transparent to a subject s if and only if when s is in state 
e, s can know that s is in state e;
- an epistemic state e is strongly transparent to a subject s if and only if when s is in 
state e, s can know that s is in state e, and when s is not in state e, s can know s is 
not in state e.
2   see albergo 2012, 2013; harris 2000.
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situation. lynne baker has strongly highlighted the connection between 
awareness and first-person perspective. Furthermore, whoever does not 
distinguish between the point of view of the first- and the one of third-
person, is mistaking by way of making the risk of representational abuse 
something more than a mere logical possibility. to say that an observer can 
also confuse a wrong action for a case of pretense does not mean that from 
the first-person perspective he is unable to distinguish between reality and 
fantasy. Indeed, the first situation seems quite common among children 
under the age of three, and this is easy to explain if, as noted above, we use 
the concept of acting “as if”. Wendy custer (1998), for example, in a series 
of studies with three years old children, has used images of people engaged 
in the action of fishing but catching a boot instead of a fish. In the pretense 
condition researchers described a man as pretending to fish. Then, two 
drawings with “thought pictures” were presented. In the first one the man 
was thinking to catch a fish, in the other one the real situation was depicted. 
children were asked to choose which one represented what the man had in 
his mind during pretense. custer reported the high percentage of correct 
answers even among children of three years, i.e., the tendency to choose 
the thought picture with the hooked fish in the pretense condition. These 
results could suggest a mentalistic interpretation, i.e., one might conclude 
that behind these performances lies the understanding that pretense comes 
from thoughts entertained by the minds of the characters. nevertheless, 
it is not difficult to give an alternative explanation of deflationary kind. 
before using meta-representational hypothesis, we may give an account of 
the results in this kind of test using the ability of the subjects to recognize 
that pretending is different from reality, and this would explain the choice 
of combining the thought picture containing a false thought with the 
pretense condition. our hypothesis has the effect of showing how children 
usually see the wrong actions as cases of pretense. however, this does not 
mean that those who make mistakes are acting according to the same 
relation to the world that is supposed in the act of pretending. We can try 
to understand the difference between these two perspectives considering 
both as our ‘constructions’. a construction is usually something that we 
realize for a purpose. For example, when we observe an action, we can 
also imagine the consequences that usually, ceteris paribus, accompany it. 
among our constructions some may be true, some may be false. in addition, 
every fiction turns out to be a construction. Nevertheless, the reverse is 
not valid because, by definition, no fiction is true. If this removes, at least 
at the conceptual level, the possibility of confusion-dementia, however, it 
only provides us a tautological solution to the issue of the alleged confusion 
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between an incorrect action and pretense from the perspective of the 
third-person. We could indeed recognize that, from the perspective of third-
person the one who observes maintains a positive attitude towards the set of 
things observed. there is some kind of regularity between our actions and 
the world. as a matter of fact, our actions are usually in keeping with the 
world because our beliefs are quite often in agreement with it. 
now, to be conscious is to be conscious of something. We can imagine 
someone who has not acquired the brentanian ‘intentionality of the 
mental’, because he is not able to put together objects of thought and 
mental orientations. he would be unable to think that something is ‘so 
and so’ because he would not have achieved the three-term relation 
between 1) subject, 2) propositional attitudes, and 3) contentful thoughts. 
however, it would be always possible to ascribe to this subject some kind 
of consciousness, at least the one of getting experience of objects, and, 
consequently, the self-consciousness obtained by distinguishing objects in 
the world and the experience of them. to be able to have different mental 
attitudes towards intentional objects would then be secondary to the ability 
to achieve different physical orientations towards real objects. the notion of 
agency is more primitive than thought. 
Piaget thought that children develop the self-world dualism through 
exercising agency, because their actions would become progressively 
more spontaneous, differentiated, and integrated. according to James 
russell, this position would be a modest proposal, because its claim is that 
interaction with objects is a necessary feature of mental development and 
self-awareness. We usually work with the idea of an organism equipped 
with representational capacities supposed to be the explicantia, the starting-
point having its explicanda in successful interactions with objects out there. 
instead, from the Piagetian point of view, the theoretical starting-point 
will be an acting and sensing organism, of course not a pure agent, within 
a world of objects. this does not mean that we do not need representations, 
it is just that they lose their priority in the relation of the mind with the 
world. this is captured by James russell when he writes that the question 
for the representational theorist is “What kind of representational medium 
or content must be innately present or must develop if this is to become 
the mind of a successful thinker and agent?” (russell, 1996, pp. 75-76). yet, 
focusing on the responsibility for our own actions and on the experience of 
the constraints that reality sets on what we can experience, the question 
becomes “What does this organism have to be able to do in relation to 





tHe FIRst-PeRson PeRsPeCtIve ReqUIReMent In PRetense
gaetano albergo università degli studi di catania
229
development is not only a matter of representing how things are out there. 
representations distinguish between a subject and a world of objects, but 
activity is necessary to establish the self-world dualism. experiencing the 
refractoriness of reality is necessary for subjectivity and self-awareness, 
because making a contribution to the object of experience, paired with the 
phenomenological value of participation, allows us to develop a subjective 
mental life set off from an objective reality. moreover, if we assume the 
dependency of subjectivity and self-awareness on agency we can also 
understand the obvious conceptual links between considering others as 
rational beings and considering them as agents. the giving and asking 
for reasons in practical reasoning presupposes that there is not a mere 
passivity in relation to putative objects of knowledge. this does not mean 
that minds may be known entirely from the outside. Knowledge of our 
own actions might not have a representational character. being an agent 
is an intrinsically first-person fact, it is known immediately and non-
observationally. as thomas nagel puts it, there is “a clash between the view 
of action from the inside and any view of it from the outside. any external 
view of an act as something that happens […] seems to omit the doing of 
it” (nagel 1979, p. 189). saying that the subject-attitude-content triad is 
not a form of primary behavior does not mean that children conceive of 
others in behavioristic terms. to perceive others as agents means, at least 
in a modest form, to recognize them as endowed with minds, and it is 
possible to perceive others as agents only if we experience being agents in 
the first-person. Nevertheless, experiencing one’s agency does not require 
the concept of agency. it is not the problem of ascribing a mental category 
to others after picking oneself out as the referent for a predicate. here, 
predicate ascription, the germinal form for the following i-thoughts, is not 
at issue. however, it is not enough just to enunciate such a conceptual claim, 
we should also look for experimental confirmations. For example, Andrew 
meltzoff (1990) showed that one year old babies are able to take a third-
person perspective in relation to their own actions. the way in which they 
recognize when they are imitated drives us to hypothesize the existence 
of two parallel abilities: the one of realizing that it is their activity what is 
reproduced in the behavior of others, and the one of being able to project 
agency in others3. 
A first important contribution that the present theory offers us consists in 
recognizing the necessity of separating the points of view of the first- and 
3   to avoid any possible confusion between the hypothesis illustrated and the thesis supported 
by the theorists of simulation by reflection, it is enough to recognize that we are talking about 
abilities that demarcate a pre-theoretical competence, while for the simulationists, there is no a 
theory that should be acquired but only a set of concepts that need to be developed.
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the third-person. recognizing that situations of direct experience lead to 
a wealth of mental activity much greater than that involved, at least in 
these early stages, in the processes of attribution to others, it also means 
having good reasons to keep a distance from the supporters of the theory-
theory approach4. to develop a theory means to increase our own capacity 
to access to the relevant theoretical concepts, whose existence is assumed 
in a disembodied way. Children’s access to their own mental life in first-
person is just a special case of access to the notions of belief, pretense, or, 
in general, of mind. access to these notions is independent by the epistemic 
perspective. one of the most common result of this kind of solution is to put 
different proto-abilities under a single category, with the consequence of 
having to explain mistaken performances with strange ad hoc hypotheses, 
such as Perner’s idea of prelief, failing to recognize that they are actually 
two different competences. When working with proto-concepts concerning 
explanatory theories it would be advisable to make sure that attributions 
to child were constrained. It is not just a matter of how fine-grained you are 
prepared to be. about pretense, a very clear example of this kind of error 
is offered to us by leslie and happé, as in their opinion “solitary pretense 
comes out simply as the special case in which the agent of Pretend is self” 
(leslie & happé, 1989, p. 210). these approaches forget that the subject has 
developed the ability to understand pretense in others because he himself 
is able to pretend. the theory of agency, therefore, allows us to support the 
hypothesis of the difference of the two perspectives even on the logical 
level. We need to recognize that being able to pretend in first-person is a 
necessary condition for being able to recognize it in the others. now, we 
may ask whether it is also a sufficient condition. It is not only a conceptual 
problem, rather, formulating it allows us to go back to the problem from 
which we started, in order to clarify how it is possible that children 
assimilate false actions of others to cases of pretense. the theory of agency 
allows us to consider children under three years of age as subjects capable of 
conceiving the other as an agent and not merely as producer and consumer 
of representations. action maintains a relation with the idea of experience 
that is not present in the explanations based on the passivity of subjects 
in relation to putative objects of knowledge. in addition, it is possible to 
interpret the tendency to see errors as cases of pretense as an example of 
the attribution of the ability to change the nature of perceptual inputs at 
will, as Piaget would say. it also allows us to put this kind of performance 
4   according to some authors concepts do not capture only salient features in objects. children 
would develop concepts as mini theories using knowledge about causal mechanisms, teleological 
purposes, hidden features, and a biologically driven ontology (see carey 1985; Keil 1989).
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within a growing executive ability rather than an emerging theory. thus, 
the first-person perspective in pretense is only a necessary condition for 
the attribution in third-person. Its insufficiency, if we put in these terms 
the inability to exclude from its extension erroneous situations, turns out 
to be an additional argument in favour of the existence of a non-observable, 
irreducible element, belonging to the first-person.
With respect to self-consciousness, i think that baker’s insistence on the 
inescapable role of language goes beyond what is justified by the facts. Early 
pretense is just an example of this problem. For example, according to Jose 
bermudez (1998) when we say that without language there would be no 
self-consciousness, we meet two circularities. The first is that the ability to 
entertain thoughts with self-consciousness precedes the competence with 
the pronoun “I”, while the hypothesis of language first makes the ability to 
entertain i-thoughts dependent on the linguistic competence. moreover, 
and this is the second circularity, the circular dependency of the two 
abilities makes it difficult to explain also how we can become self-conscious. 
so, if each of the two capacities presupposes the other one, what do we learn 
first, to entertain I-thoughts or to use I-sentences? For Bermudez there 
are also kinds of non-conceptual self-consciousness, something similar 
to self-recognition. these forms of thought would not be based on any 
linguistic mediation. if the thought may be non-linguistic, then even self-
consciousness can be non-conceptual. thus, the competence in the pronoun 
“i” is far from being regarded as a prerequisite of self-conscious thought. We 
know that bermudez adopts Peacocke’s idea that there are non-conceptual 
contents that are not representational in nature. For example, the function 
of objects in pretense games may be a good example of this kind of content. 
the pretender projects a minimum image onto the real situation, therefore 
realizing real departures from reality. so a stick becomes a horse, a sceptre, 
a sword5. 
looking for a primitive form of self-consciousness in infants lacking 
language, Bermudez relies upon scientific data about growing abilities, such 
as reaching-behavior, object-focused attention and pointing. according to 
bermudez, a lot of evidence pushes a primitive self-consciousness back into 
pre-linguistic stages of human development. so, in order to abandon the 
idea that self-consciousness is a matter of having “i” thoughts (thoughts 
immune to error through misidentification) we need to investigate the 
evolutionary path starting from its lowest stages, such as “the capacity to 
feel sensations” and agency. in fact, bermudez argues that:
5   see gombrich (1963).
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distinguishing self-awareness involves a recognition of oneself as a 
perceiver, an agent, and a bearer of reactive attitudes against a contrast 
space of other perceivers, agents, and bearers of reactive attitudes. it can 
only make sense to speak of the infant’s experience of being a performer in 
the eyes of the other if the infant is aware of himself as an agent and of his 
mother as a perceiver (bermudez 1998, pp. 252-253).
many abilities usually related to “i” thoughts of language users would be 
detectable into a broadened non-conceptual point of view, but i think we 
need to take into account a further two cognitive abilities, so far forgotten 
and not in plain sight in baker’s account. First, we need conscious memory. 
Without it, a child cannot distinguish his experience from permanent 
features of the environment which instantiate a given experience. you 
can find your way back to a particular place by sheer luck or, as Bermudez 
recognized, because you consciously remember it. a continuous present 
gives way to a temporally extended point of view. moreover, this point of 
view also depends on “basic inductive generalizations at the non-conceptual 
level”.
i would add that it is not obvious that if we had an explanation of how we 
can entertain i-thoughts, then we would have explained everything there 
is to explain. What would remain to be explained is the phenomenal side of 
self-consciousness that is not reducible to the introspective accessibility to 
information. For example, according to Pietro Perconti (2008) the thought-
language principle is wrong because it does not distinguish between the 
phenomenal aspects and the cognitive ones of self-awareness. having 
the ability to refer to my-self my own mental states and being aware of 
them belongs to the cognitive aspect of self. the feeling of being yourself 
is instead something that has to do with the phenomenal aspects of the 
matter. to explain how we get i-thoughts is a psychological issue, but it 
leaves out the phenomenology linked to them. the notion of non-conceptual 
content allows us to introduce the idea of nonrepresentational properties, 
that is to say, a kind of sensational properties that an experience has in 
virtue of what it is like to have that experience.
it can be concluded that between the simple consciousness and self-
consciousness would be appropriate to recognize intermediate states, 
in order to avoid reducing the first to the mere ability to intentionally 
generate relevant stimulus-response correlations, therefore making self-
consciousness a function of language with the consequence, for example, 
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of not attributing self-consciousness to people suffering from speech 
disorders, such as aphasia. consciousness is not just a matter of ability to 
discriminate environmental stimuli and to select from a range of possible 
responses, but it is also a matter of being aware of this experience and 
feeling something while being in this state of awareness.
tHe FIRst-PeRson PeRsPeCtIve ReqUIReMent In PRetense
gaetano albergo università degli studi di catania
234
REFERENCES
albergo, g. (2012), “does ontogenesis of social ontology start with 
Pretense?”, Phenomenology & Mind, 3, pp. 120-126;
albergo, g. (2013), l’impegno ontologico del pretense, rivista di estetica, 53, pp. 
155-177;
baker, l.r. (2013), naturalism and the first-Person Perspective, oxford university 
Press, new york;
bermúdez, J.l. (1998), The Paradox of self-consciousness, mit Press, cambridge 
(ma);
carey, s., (1985), conceptual change in childhood, mit Press, cambridge (ma);
custer, W.l. (1998), “a comparison of young children’s understanding of 
contradictory mental representations in Pretence, memory, and belief”, 
child Development, 67, pp. 678-688;
gombrich, e. (1963), Meditations on a hobby horse and Other essays on the Theory 
of art, Phaidon, london.
harris, P.l. (2000), The Work of the imagination, blackwell, oxford;
Keil, F.c. (1989), concepts, Kinds, and cognitive Development, mit Press, 
cambridge (ma);
leslie, a.m., & happé, F. (1989), “autism and ostensive communication: the 
relevance of metarepresentation”, Development and Psychopathology, 1, pp. 
205-212;
lillard, a. (2001), “Pretend Play as twin earth: a social-cognitive analysis”, 
Developmental review, 21, pp. 495-531;
meltzoff, a.n. (1990), foundations for a Developing conception of the self, in d. 
cicchetti & m. beeghly (eds.), The self in Transition, chicago university Press, 
chicago, pp. 139-164;
nagel, t. (1979), Mortal Questions, cambridge university Press, cambridge;
Perconti, P. (2008), l’autocoscienza, laterza, roma-bari;
Perner, J., baker, s., & hutton, d. (1994), “Prelief: the conceptual origins 
of belief and Pretence”, in c. lewis & P. mitchell (eds.), children’s early 
understanding of Mind: Origins and Development, pp. 261-286, erlbaum, hillsdale 
nJ;
russell, J. (1996), agency, its role in Mental Development, taylor & Francis, 
erlbaum (uK);
searle, J. (1975), “the logical status of Fictional discourse”, new literary 
history, 6, pp. 319-332.
tHe FIRst-PeRson PeRsPeCtIve ReqUIReMent In PRetense
gaetano albergo università degli studi di catania
